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Definition/Introduction
“The military-industrial complex” (MIC) refers to
a self-sustaining politico-economic system that
perpetuates proﬁtability in military supplies
industries, de facto in multiple countries but pri-
marily in the USA. It is made up of competing
and/or collaborating entities – the maintenance of
which is on the whole ﬁnancially advantageous to
all concerned. These include professional soldiers
et al., managers and owners of industries that
supply military equipment, government ofﬁcials
whose careers and interests are tied to military
expenditure, and legislators whose districts bene-
ﬁt from defense procurement (Rosen 1973,
pp. 1–2). The complex business objectives sought
by these and other related personnel are fostered
in part by exalting technical possibilities but also
by spreading fear as to dangers that are imminent
and can be countered only by maintaining the
highest feasible level of military preparedness
(Hallowell 2016). In pursuit of these objectives,
MIC participants’ budgetary requests amount to
meticulously orchestrated industry advertising
portrayed as strategic force requirements. Given
this state of affairs, the preeminent business ethi-
cal questions with regard to an MIC involve ends
as well as means, i.e., not only death and destruc-
tion but systemically inherent pork and waste.
MIC Companies’ War-Oriented Strategy
C. Wright Mills (1956) formulated the concept of
an MIC, and President Dwight Eisenhower
famously warned about it in his 1961 Farewell
Address. The entity itself had come into being
during WWII as competing countries built up
their military hardware in concert with the build-
up of military manpower.When that war came to a
cataclysmic end, the losers’ industries were
severely paciﬁed; but the winners, especially in
the USA, intensiﬁed their production of
warmaking equipment and, no less assiduously,
their search for enemies against whom that equip-
ment could be used (short of nuclear holocaust).
And whenever so used if not used up the user
government needed to fund so-called defense
industry corporations to replace shortfalls of old
equipment; and, increasingly, this process of
replacing the old came to be supplemented with
projects to introduce new means of mayhem
aimed at meeting speculative future challenges.
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If this industry consisted as do others of free-
standing companies that respond to changes in the
market by changing their mix of products to
remain relevant, its list of products would have
changed considerably over the past seventy-some
years. And in fact, budgetary reductions were at
times deemed circumstantially possible and desir-
able, e.g., at the end of a war, notably that in
Vietnam, or more so following the demise of the
USSR. MIC companies are not free-standing,
however, but depend on government funding the
size of which is based on a need to confront
dangers that seemingly can only increase. Thus
challenged the industry seldom discontinues old
products, not even if the military itself asserts no
need for them; and new products are rarely left
unfunded merely because experts claim they will
never be effective. In an artiﬁcial budgetary cli-
mate like this, in which careful estimates of
demonstrable need are seldom relied on, budget-
ary bottom lines are more likely to be derived
from actual confrontations such as the September
11, 2001, attacks. For these lend weight to esti-
mates of risks posed by terrorists whose defeat
will require a massive infusion of funds into com-
panies whose products and services will be
needed if the nation is to be adequately
“defended.”
The MIC’s monetary distribution system
involves interdependencies so complex that
downsizing, never mind abolishing, it is generally
deemed virtually unthinkable. Lobbyists for the
contractors give their preferences weight by dis-
tributing vast sums of money to parties issuing
contracts through the US Department of Defense
(DoD) (OpenSecrets.org 2015). In addition, the
actual manufacture of parts for weapons systems
is distributed among plants deliberately located in
most if not every Congressional district.
A Congressional representative’s campaign con-
tributions, hence voter support, ultimately depend
on his or her level of support for the budget from
which local defense manufacturers receive their
contracts. Governmental public and nonpublic
MIC employees similarly risk losing their jobs if
they are not supportive of this system in every
way (Hartung 2011, Chap. 1; Reich 2010). Apart
from these domestic arrangements, many of the
companies dealing with DoD are multinational in
scope, and thus so is the US MIC. Non-US
weapons procurers deal directly not with contrac-
tors but with Foreign Military Sales (FMS), a
program in DoD, that uses the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency as its intermediary.
MIC Budget Amounts
The size of the US MIC budget has grown con-
siderably over the course of its existence since
WWII. Consider these numbers adjusted for inﬂa-
tion. In 1948, the main but not total DoD budget
was just over $97 billion. It rose to $444.5 billion
in 1952 at the peak of the Korean War, then fell to
as low as $216.3 billion in 1955. Yearly increases
up to and during the Vietnam era brought the total
to $413.3 billion in 1968. Decline during the
1970s was reversed during Reagan’s presidency,
up to $551.8 billion in 1985. Totals then declined
again and stood at $391 billion in 2000.
A ﬁscal year later, terrorists’ carried out their
highjacked planes assaults, and thereafter totals
climbed to $756.3 billion in 2010 (war peak for
Iraq and Afghanistan). But by 2015, they had
leveled off to a Reagan-era size of $501.8 billion
or, by another calculation, $598.5 billion
(McCartney and McCartney 2015, pp. 23–25).
The latter ﬁgure represents 54% of 2015 discre-
tionary spending, and if the $65.3 billion for Vet-
erans Affairs is added in, the military budget rose
to 60% (National Priorities 2015).
The complete total ofMIC funding is not easily
determined, because much of it is not shared with
the public, but a partial accounting is attainable.
To begin, defense-related employees include not
only military personnel but also in-house civilian
employees and independent contractors. The
resulting number of defense-related personnel
employed in the US executive branch is arguably
larger than the number of executive branch
employees whose jobs are not defense related. In
addition, defense contractors paid over $50 mil-
lion in 2015 to 655 lobbyists 423 of whom
focused on defense (Cohen 2015). Even if so,
claims that the MIC generates jobs is challenged
by counterclaims that more jobs would be created
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if the funds involved were spent on civilian pro-
jects (Pollin and Garrett-Peltier 2007).
Some military-related funding does not pass
through the DoD budget. For ﬁscal 2016, for
example, its budget of $573 billion did not include
the additional $163 billion earmarked for the
Department of Veterans Affairs. Privately funded
and yet perhaps of seminal importance are the
Grand Strategy Programs (GSP) whereby conser-
vative philanthropists pay intellectuals at a small
number of universities to do research and teaching
conducive to creating a “Long War University”
that prepares students for permanent war. Collec-
tively, the participating universities constitute
“national warfare state universities.” Their mis-
sion is to educate students with regard to counter-
insurgency or COIN. Their funding levels are, for
example, $17.5 million to Yale University and
$225,000 to Temple University (Horn and Ruff
2011).
Of course, any estimate of the MIC’s total
budget would be incomplete without inclusion of
its nuclear weapons arsenal. At the height of the
ColdWar, the USA and USSR had 70,000 nuclear
weapons. The 2010 New START Treaty called for
reductions to 1,550 each, and by 2014 they
together had only 16,200 (Russia 8,500; US
7,700). Seven other nations together add another
thousand nuclear weapons to the total. Reductions
notwithstanding, then, the total number of nuclear
weapons in existence is still very large and
involves too many possessing nations.
A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
would reduce these numbers still more substan-
tially; but to achieve the necessary two-thirds
support, it needs to be signed by six more nations
including China (McCartney and McCartney
2015, pp. 120–131).
Nuclear weapons being so incomparably
destructive, a number of activist leaders and orga-
nizations call for their complete abolition. Public
opinion polls show comparable views worldwide
and in the USA, with Americans increasingly
negative about their use in WWII. This wide-
spread anti-nuke attitude is drowned out, how-
ever, by the supportive roar from the MIC, and
its preferences prevail. Publicly knowable
funding for nuclear weapons over the nine ﬁscal
years 2010–2018 is $179 billion, rising from
$16 billion to $25 billion, i.e., an average of
$20 billion per year. (This total combines DoD
funds with funds allocated to the Department of
Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administra-
tion.) In themselves these are comparatively mod-
est numbers, but they hold places for a plan to
replace each leg of the “nuclear triad” – land-
based, submarine-based, and bomber-delivered –
over the next 20 years. The cost of this major
refurbishing is an estimated $500 billion. In the
meantime, a few more status-seeking countries
(e.g., North Korea) will probably have developed
their own nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
MIC Budget Allocations
During the post-Reagan years of decline, the US
MIC underwent massive consolidation. Thereaf-
ter, the surviving ﬁrms won larger contracts, espe-
cially after 9/11. For example, the 2012 US
defense industry was assigned a budget of
$793.9 billion. Much of that amount went to ten
companies whose 2011 contracts and revenue
were as follows: Lockheed Martin,$40 billion
and $46 billion, respectively; Boeing, $21.5 bil-
lion and $69 billion; General Dynamics, $19.5 bil-
lion and $33 billion; Raytheon, $15 billion and
$25 billion; United Technologies, $8 billion and
$58 billion; SAIC, $7.4 billion and $11.1 billion;
L-3 Communications, $7.38 billion and $15.7 bil-
lion; Oshkosh Corporation, $4.94 billion and
$7.6 billion; McKesson Corporation, $4.7 billion
and $112 billion (McCartney and McCartney
2015, pp. 36–38).
The 2012 US military budget cited above was
63% greater than the total of $486.7 being spent
that year by the next nine countries, which, in
order of size, includes China’s $89.8, the UK’s
$62.7, France’s $58.8, Japan’s $58.4, Russia’s
$52.7, Saudi Arabia’s $46.2, Germany’s $44.2,
India’s $37.3, and Brazil’s $36.6 (McCartney
and McCartney 2015, p. 11). Among the top
arms producers in the world outside the USA in
2013, the UK’s BAE Systems was third largest
with arms sales of $26,820,000, Trans-European
EADS was seventh largest ($15,740,000), Italy’s
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Finmeccanica and France’s Thales were ninth and
tenth with arms sales each over $10,000,000. The
largest Russian arms producer that year was
twelfth place Almaz-Antey ($8,030,000) (Kelley
2014).
The Pentagon (DoD’s headquarters), built to
house 40,000 military and civilian employees,
currently has 23,000 plus 3,000 nondefense sup-
port personnel. As for contractors, the DoD by
2008 employed 155,826 private contractors in
Iraq and only 152,275 troops. Also in 2008, it
had 108,000 contractors in Afghanistan and only
65,700 troops (McCartney and McCartney 2015,
p. 30). To this one needs to add separately allo-
cated funds for military intelligence operations
(70% of which is now being spent by private
contractors) (Bloomﬁeld 2013).
As recently reorganized, the Intelligence bud-
get, initially allocated to DoD, is dispersed to the
National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
(TIARA) funding aggregation (GlobalSecurity.
org). Because of Edward Snowden, we possess
details of the 2013 US budget for national intelli-
gence. Totaling $52.6 billion, this budget covered
a wide variety of occupations and services.
Twenty-eight percent went to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, which paid its own 107,035
employees and 18% of all federal contractors.
$10.5 billion went to the National Security
Agency, and another $4.9 billion to “contingency
operations” in Iraq and Afghanistan (Brown n.d.).
In retrospect, various areas in the world where
bombs and bomb materials were produced and/or
tested have become toxic wastelands, e.g.,the
A-test site at Bikini Atoll, the Columbia River
area where the Hanford Project produced pluto-
nium, and a host of other areas contaminated by
military testing of nuclear and other weapons
(Hanrahan and Smith 2011). So if one is serious
about determining the total costs incurred by the
MIC, damages due to weapons testing should be
included, and these extend to the damage inﬂicted
on persons, property, and environment by use of
weapons in live wars. These amounts are
immense and to a large extent irreversible, but
restitution claims are severely suppressed by the
pro-warmaker character of international law. For
example, in one attempt by US and Afghan nego-
tiators to agree on compensatory damages to prop-
erty arising out of the war in Afghanistan, the
latter claimed $100 million, the former came up
with a ﬁgure of $1.4 million (Shah and Nordland
2011; Kamrany and Taft 2012). Such damage
awards, however calculated, are generally much
smaller than those for environmental damages
(Hulme 2004).
In short, the task of determining whether efﬁ-
ciencies created by the MIC outweigh its multi-
faceted excesses is a project still underway. Its
completion requires addressing various questions
as to scope, i.e., regarding which additional enti-
ties are engaged actively or passively in MIC-
related activities. There clearly are such entities,
so the very concept of a military-industrial com-
plex is often considered incomplete without inclu-
sion of these unnamed components. Doing so
would yield, for example, a military-industrial-
congressional-lobbyist complex. Still more trou-
bling is an emerging plan to shut down or privat-
ize a number of US government civilian agencies
and transfer their funds to MIC entities (Hartung
2017). Whether such a plan is ever accomplished,
it can already be argued that some participants in
the MIC are engaging in unethical business prac-
tices (Byrne 2010, 2017).
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